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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the impact of competition in the banking
industry on ￿nancial market activity. In particular, we explore this issue
in a setting where banks simultaneously insure individuals against liquid-
ity risk and o⁄er loans to promote intertemporal consumption smoothing.
In addition, spatial separation and private information generate a trans-
actions role for money.
Interestingly, we demonstrate that the industrial organization of the
￿nancial system bears signi￿cant implications for the e⁄ects of monetary
policy. Under perfect competition, higher rates of money growth lead to
lower interest rates and a higher volume of lending activity. In contrast,
in a monopoly banking sector, money growth restricts the availability of
funds and raises the cost of borrowing.
JEL Classi￿cation: E43, E52, L11
Keywords: Monetary Policy, Financial Sector Concentration, Price
Competition
1 Introduction
Recent evidence indicates that the degree of ￿nancial sector competition varies
markedly across countries. For example, within the European Monetary Union,
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1Greece and Belgium have highly concentrated industries while France and Ger-
many are much less so.1 Moreover, in the United States, a number of studies
have documented that there are large di⁄erences in the degree of concentration
in local markets. In particular, concentration is much higher in rural markets
than in urban areas.2;3
In light of these observations, this paper examines the impact of the compet-
itive structure of the banking industry on ￿nancial market outcomes. Using a
model of Bertrand competition, we compare economies with competitive bank-
ing sectors to fully concentrated industries.4 Under perfect competition, higher
rates of money growth increase the amount of loans and lower interest rates. In
contrast, in a monopoly banking economy, money growth leads to less lending
activity and higher costs of borrowing.
Consequently, our results suggest that the industrial organization of the ￿-
nancial system should be an important factor in the determination of monetary
policy. In particular, the ￿ndings for the monopolistic economy mirror recent
empirical studies which emphasize that in￿ ation generally inhibits ￿nancial sec-
tor performance. For example, Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) point out that
the volume of lending to the private sector is lower in high in￿ ation countries.5
This implies that noncompetitive behavior is a signi￿cant aspect of ￿nancial
market activity.
In order to provide deeper insight into the results, we proceed by outlining
the details of our framework. In the model, there are two types of agents who
value di⁄erent opportunities to smooth consumption. The ￿rst group of agents,
depositors, experience liquidity risk and wish to smooth income ￿ uctuations
across states. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), ￿nancial institutions provide
risk pooling services to help insure individuals against such risk.6 The second
group of agents, borrowers, do not experience liquidity risk. However, loans
1Beck, Demigruc-Kunt, and Levine (2003) report that over the period from 1990-1997, the
average level of bank concentration across 99 countries was 0.72 but ranged from 1.0 to 0.2.
2Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) de￿ne the local market in urban areas while coun-
ties are used to measure activity in rural areas.
3Although the degree of concentration di⁄ers across economies, there is also concern that
the industry is generally becoming less competitive over time. For example, there were around
19,000 di⁄erent ￿nancial institutions in the United States in 1989. Nearly ten years later, only
10,000 were in operation. For more discussion, see the Bank for International Settlements
(2001).
4Sharpe (1991) constructs a model with switching costs to determine the relationship be-
tween market structure and prices in retail bank deposit markets. In a partial equilibrium
framework, Whitesell (1992) considers the deposit rates o⁄ered when banks experience com-
petition for transactions services. Hutchison (1995) develops an intertemporal asset pricing
model with Cournot competition to study deposit rates.
5See Huybens and Smith (1999) for more discussion on the relationship between in￿ation
and ￿nancial markets.
6Fecht and Martin (2005) construct a model based upon Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
to study the relationship between depositors￿access to ￿nancial markets and the degree of
competition among banks. Depending on the competitive structure of the banking industry,
greater access to ￿nancial markets may lead to less risk sharing. However, in contrast to
our framework, they do not consider the interactions between the degree of competition and
monetary policy.
2from banks help them to smooth consumption over time. Thus, the economy
is composed of two di⁄erent ￿nancial markets: a deposit market and a credit
market. As we demonstrate, there are important linkages between the two
markets.7 Notably, pricing decisions in the deposit market a⁄ect the availability
of funds in the credit market.
Following Townsend (1987) and Schreft and Smith (1997), spatial separation
and private information generate a transactions role for money. The economy
consists of two geographically separated islands and communication across is-
lands is not possible. This friction limits trading opportunities so that private
liabilities do not circulate. In this manner, liquidity risk is motivated by relo-
cation shocks which force individuals to move to the other island. Since money
is the only asset that can be traded across locations, depositors who experience
positive realizations of the relocation shock will seek to withdraw funds in the
form of money balances. These individuals will consume less than depositors
who do not move because money is dominated in rate of return. Neverthe-
less, banks must acquire money holdings in order to provide individuals with
insurance against the liquidity risk that they encounter.
As a benchmark, we study the e⁄ects of money growth if the banking sector
is perfectly competitive. Under perfect competition, banks provide lenders with
an amount of insurance to maximize their expected utility. In this setting, a
type of Tobin e⁄ect occurs. At higher rates of money growth, the costs of
holding money increase. As a result, banks choose to reduce the liquidity of
their portfolios and supply more loans to the credit market. This leads to an
increase in lending activity and lower interest rates.
Next, we study the behavior of a monopoly bank. Since the monopolist seeks
to maximize pro￿ts, it only provides enough insurance to induce individuals to
deposit their funds. In this sense, market power imposes a pricing distortion
in the deposit market.8 Consequently, the e⁄ects of monetary policy are sig-
ni￿cantly di⁄erent than in a perfectly competitive ￿nancial system.9 At higher
in￿ ation rates, individuals who experience relocation shocks would receive a
lower rate of return. In order to provide depositors with su¢ cient insurance,
banks acquire additional money balances. The increase in money holdings re-
duces the availability of funds to borrowers. Moreover, interest rates are higher.
In this manner, the competitive structure of the ￿nancial system has important
7Antinol￿ and Kawamura (2008) discuss the relative importance of banks versus other
types of ￿nancial markets for monetary policy. While banks help insure individuals against
liquidity risk, ￿nancial markets allow banks to insure themselves against risks from investment
opportunities.
8In the United States, both Berger and Hannan (1989) and Neumark and Sharpe (1992)
￿nd that monopolistic banks exercise their in￿uence by distorting prices. To be speci￿c,
Berger and Hannan observe that banks in markets with higher concentration pay lower rates
on deposits. In contrast, Neumark and Sharpe ￿nd that concentration is associated with asym-
metric price rigidities ￿banks generally pay higher rates of return when market rates increase,
but monopolistic banks adjust them more slowly. In contrast, downward price adjustments
are much more ￿exible.
9In contrast to imperfections from market power, Bhattacharya, Haslag, and Martin (2005)
study the implications of private information for optimal monetary policy. Due to the friction
of moral hazard, the Friedman Rule may not be the optimal monetary policy.
3rami￿cations for the e⁄ects of monetary policy.
Related Literature
Our work contributes to a growing literature that investigates the economic
impact of the industrial organization of the ￿nancial system. To begin, Boyd,
DeNicolo, and Smith (2004) construct an overlapping generations model with
aggregate liquidity risk to study how competition a⁄ects the probability of a
banking crisis. If the in￿ ation rate is su¢ ciently high, banking crises are more
likely to occur in a monopolistic banking system. In addition, Paal, Smith,
and Wang (2005) develop an endogenous growth model to study the impact of
￿nancial competition on economic growth. Interestingly, they point out that
banking concentration may be growth-enhancing.10
While our research seeks to determine how banking competition a⁄ects ￿-
nancial market activity, there are important di⁄erences compared to previous
work on the topic. For example, in Boyd, DeNicolo, and Smith, banks face
an exogenous rate of return to investment projects. However, our framework
incorporates a credit market in which the interest rate and volume of lending
activity respond to the competitive structure of the ￿nancial system. More-
over, the impact of monetary policy depends on the degree of competition in
signi￿cant ways.
Our work also contrasts with Paal, Smith, and Wang. Although their pro-
duction economy generates an endogenous rate of return to investment, ￿nancial
institutions provide di⁄erent services compared to our model. Both papers con-
sider the role of banks for providing insurance against liquidity risk, but Paal,
Smith, and Wang view that ￿nancial institutions act as intermediaries which
channel funds to promote capital accumulation and growth. By comparison, we
emphasize that banks are important institutions which provide risk pooling ser-
vices and intertemporal consumption smoothing. Notably, we show that pricing
decisions in the deposit market can a⁄ect economic activity in the credit mar-
ket. In doing so, we can further examine how monetary policy interacts with
the competitive structure of the ￿nancial system. The results are qualitatively
signi￿cant ￿frictions from monopoly power may be responsible for the detri-
mental impact of in￿ ation on credit market activity observed in the empirical
literature. In addition, we study the impact of monetary policy in economies
where the government￿ s seigniorage revenues are redistributed to individuals in
the private sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic envi-
ronment. Section 3 studies activity in a perfectly competitive banking system.
Section 4 considers the impact of monetary policy in a monopolistic banking
sector. Section 5 extends the model to examine the impact of monetary policy
10Pagano (1993) shows that market concentration has an adverse e⁄ect on economic growth.
As a result of the higher rate on loans, Guzman (2000) ￿nds that default is more likely to
occur in an economy with a monopolistic banking industry.
4in economies where the government￿ s seigniorage revenues are redistributed to
agents in the private sector. Section 6 provides concluding remarks. The proofs
of major results are provided in the Appendix.
2 Environment
We consider a discrete-time economy populated by an in￿nite sequence of two-
period lived overlapping generations, plus an initial old generation. In partic-
ular, the economy consists of two symmetric, geographically separated islands.
On each island, there are three types of agents: depositors, borrowers, and
bankers. While the population of both depositors and borrowers is equal to
one, the population of bankers is given by N: The competitive structure of the
￿nancial system depends on the population of bankers. If N = 1, there is only
one bank available to individuals. In contrast, if N > 1, the banking industry
behaves in a perfectly competitive manner. Although the population resides in
two separate locations, there is a single consumption good available on both
islands. The price of one unit of goods in units of currency is common across
locations and is de￿ned by Pt.
Each depositor is born with x units of the consumption good but does not
receive an endowment when old. In addition, depositors only derive utility from




1￿￿ , where ￿ 2 (0;1). In
contrast to depositors, borrowers receive y units of the consumption good when
old. Moreover, borrowers derive utility from consumption in both periods of








1￿￿ . Finally, bankers do not have any endowments. Like depositors,
they only value second period consumption. However, bankers are risk neutral.11
Private information serves as the primary trade friction in the economy.
Although each island is characterized by complete information, communication
across islands is not possible. Consequently, private liabilities do not circulate.
Moreover, depositors in the economy are subject to relocation shocks. Each
period, a fraction of young depositors must move to the other island. The
probability of relocation, ￿, is exogenous, publicly known, and the same in each
island. Unlike depositors, borrowers are not subject to relocation.
As in standard random relocation models, money alleviates trade frictions
made di¢ cult by spatial separation. In particular, it is the only asset that can
cross locations. Since money is the only asset that can cross locations, deposi-
tors who learn they will be relocated will liquidate all their asset holdings into
currency. Random relocation thus plays the same role that liquidity preference
shocks perform in Diamond and Dybvig (1983).
Banks provide two major services in the economy. First, they insure de-
positors against liquidity shocks. Since banks provide insurance against the
11If the banking system is fully concentrated, the monopoly bank earns positive pro￿ts.
Since bankers derive utility in the second period, they retain their net revenues for consump-
tion. This follows Boyd, De Nicolo, and Smith (2004) and Paal, Smith, and Wang (2005).
5shocks, each young depositor will put all of her income in the bank. Second,
as borrowers value consumption in both periods of their lives, ￿nancial inter-
mediaries provide them with an opportunity to smooth their consumption by
issuing loans. In this manner, banks o⁄er a schedule of rates of return for each
unit of deposits and charge interest rates for each unit of loans. With deposits
received, banks allocate funds to real money balances, mt, and loans, lt.
The ￿nal agent in the economy is a central bank that adopts a constant
money growth rule. The total nominal amount of money in each location at
time t is given by Mt: The evolution of the money supply on each island follows
Mt = ￿Mt￿1, where ￿ is the gross rate of money creation. Money holdings by
each old individual from the initial generation are equal to M0:
Next, we describe the timing of events and actions. At the initial stage
of date t, young depositors receive their endowments and banks announce the
schedule of interest rates (rm
t if relocated and rn
t if not relocated). Given interest
rates in the deposit market, young depositors leave their dt units of goods at
local banks. With deposits received, banks choose portfolio allocations between
money and loans. The amount of cash that banks acquire comes from two
sources. First, money balances can be obtained by conducting trades with
old movers. In particular, banks provide movers with
Mt￿1
Pt
units of goods in
exchange for their currency holdings. Furthermore, ￿nancial institutions receive
additional currency through monetary injections from the the government. With
the remaining funds, banks issue loans to young borrowers.
After bank portfolios for the current period are established, old borrowers
receive their endowments. Due to their obligations in the credit market, bor-
rowers must pay back their loans along with interest to the bank. Banks use
these funds to ￿nance payments to old depositors or consume them directly as
pro￿ts. At the end of period t, young depositors learn their location status.
Those who must move will go to the bank and withdraw currency. At the end
of the period, relocation occurs and all old agents consume and die.12
We continue by explaining the behavior of each group of individuals.
2.1 Depositors
Depositors are born with endowments but derive utility from consumption only
in their old-age. As in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), depositors bene￿t from
the risk pooling services of ￿nancial institutions. While individuals may deposit
their funds with banks, they also have the option of choosing not to participate in
the ￿nancial system. For example, depositors may possess storage technologies
12In our benchmark framework, we assume that the government retains its seigniorage
revenues. In this manner, in￿ation tax revenues do not a⁄ect asset allocation decisions. This
follows Paal, Smith, and Wang (2005). However, in Section 5 below, we extend the model
to include in￿ation-￿nanced government debt. Consequently, seigniorage revenues will be
redistributed from old movers to old non-movers. That is, in￿ation taxes redistribute income
across di⁄erent groups of depositors. In the Appendix, we also demonstrate that our results
are robust to settings in which seigniorage revenues are redistributed from old movers to old
borrowers.
6that allow them to transfer income over time. For simplicity, the utility from
autarky (opting out of the banking system) is exogenous and given by u:13
However, if the value of autarky is su¢ ciently low, depositors leave all of their
funds at banks:
dt = x (1)
2.2 Borrowers
Borrowers receive endowments when old and do not experience liquidity shocks.
Furthermore, they value consumption during their youth and old-age. In order
to smooth consumption, they seek to obtain loans (ld
t) from ￿nancial institu-

























Borrowers￿loan demand functions have standard properties. For example,
an individual￿ s demand for funds is inversely related to the cost of borrowing.
If agents obtain higher levels of income in old-age, they will borrow more. In
contrast, if borrowers place more weight on old-age utility, the demand for loans
will fall.
Depending on the degree of competition, banks will provide di⁄erent levels
of insurance against liquidity risk. As a result, the demand for money balances
in the economy will be in￿ uenced by the industrial organization of the ￿nancial
system. In turn, ￿nancial sector competition will determine the availability
of funds to the credit market. Furthermore, through these features of ￿nancial
market activity, we are able to demonstrate that market power leads to di⁄erent
e⁄ects of monetary policy.
3 Perfectly Competitive Banks
In a perfectly competitive banking industry, banks compete against each other
for deposits. Intermediaries are Nash competitors; that is, banks announce rates
of return (rm
t ;rn
t ), taking the announced rates of return of other banks as given.
13Notably, the value of autarky is independent of the rate of return to money. That is, as
autarky represents a situation in which individuals do not participate in the ￿nancial system,
they do not have access to money balances. We elaborate on this restriction in Section 4
below.
7Then, each bank chooses a schedule (rm
t ;rn
t ;mt;lt) to maximize the expected
















subject to a balance sheet constraint:
x ￿ mt + lt (5)
Relocated agents cannot access their account in the other location due to
limited communication. As a result, they must use money to trade for goods.
Therefore, the return to relocated individuals depends on the amount of reserves
and in￿ ation:
￿rm




In contrast, agents who do not move can keep their funds in the bank. The rate
of return will be determined by the bank￿ s revenue from the credit market:
(1 ￿ ￿)rn
t x ￿ Rtlt (7)
In addition, if the return of relocated agents is more than the return of
nonrelocated agents, individuals will lie about their types. Consequently, they
would all seek to withdraw deposits at the end of the period. For these reasons,




Finally, in order to induce individuals to deposit their funds, the expected
utility of each depositor must satisfy a participation constraint. In particular,
young depositors may choose not to participate in the ￿nancial system. Con-









To maximize an individual￿ s expected utility, banks allocate funds to cur-













As ￿ < 1; the bank￿ s money demand function is decreasing in its return to invest-
ment opportunities. This occurs for the standard reasons in monetary models
￿higher rates of return to interest-bearing assets raise the opportunity cost of
holding money. Similar arguments apply to the e⁄ects of in￿ ation. At higher
8in￿ ation rates, the value of real money balances will be lower. Consequently,
each bank chooses to allocate less deposits to money holdings.
Equilibrium We proceed to examine economic outcomes in the steady-
state. Given the monetary authority￿ s ￿xed money growth rule, it is easily
shown that the gross in￿ ation rate,
Pt+1
Pt , is equal to ￿.
De￿nition 1. A steady-state equilibrium in a perfectly competitive banking
industry is an economy such that:
1. depositors put all of their endowments in banks, (1) and (9);
2. each bank￿ s objective is to maximize the expected utility of a representative
depositor, (4), and
3. the self-selection condition for depositors holds (8).
Proposition 1. Assume that u is su¢ ciently small. In addition, sup-










(1 ￿ ￿). Under this condition, a steady-state equilibrium
in a perfectly competitive banking sector exists and is unique.
To provide interpretation for the conditions in the Proposition, it is useful
to recognize that we seek to study economies in which money is dominated in
rate of return. Moreover, the economy should have an active banking sector.
In this manner, the ￿rst condition guarantees that individuals deposit their
funds at banks. In addition, the interest rate on loans will be higher if there is
more demand by borrowers. This occurs if borrowers receive a large amount of
income in old-age. As a result, the second condition establishes that money is
dominated by the rate of return in the credit market.
We continue by investigating the e⁄ect of monetary policy on credit market
outcomes.
Proposition 2. Suppose that a steady-state under perfect competition exists.
If this occurs, higher in￿ation leads to an increase in the amount of loans.
Furthermore, there is a negative relationship between the growth rate of money
and the interest rate in the credit market.
When in￿ ation rates are higher, the cost of holding money increases. In
order to maximize the expected utility of a representative depositor, perfectly
competitive banks devote less funds to money balances. As a result, the amount
of loans increases and interest rates in the credit market fall.
4 A Monopoly Bank
We now examine an economy in which the banking sector is fully concentrated.
In our framework, monopoly power leads to two important considerations for
9￿nancial market activity. First, because there is only one bank available to de-
positors, the monopolist is the only ￿nancial institution that provides insurance
against liquidity risk in the economy. Second, as the monopolist is also the only
supplier of credit, it takes into account that the interest rate it charges will a⁄ect
the total demand for funds by borrowers. Notably, money holdings and loans are
the only two investment opportunities available to the bank. Consequently, the
pricing distortions across ￿nancial markets are linked together. These distor-
tions bear signi￿cant rami￿cations for the impact of monetary policy on credit
market activity.
In the economy with a perfectly competitive ￿nancial system, each bank
chooses its loan supply and interest rates in the deposit market to maximize
the expected utility of depositors. That is, taking the price of loans in the
credit market as given, perfectly competitive banks design portfolio allocations
to appropriately insure depositors against liquidity risk. In contrast to perfectly
competitive banks, the monopolist exploits market power by choosing the in-
terest rate in the credit market to earn positive pro￿ts. In particular, it sets a
schedule (rm
t ; rn




t ; mt; Rt
Rtld
t(Rt) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)rn





As in the economy with perfectly competitive banks, depositors must receive
su¢ cient incentives to deposit funds in the bank. Since there is only one bank
available, the monopolist can extract all of the gains from using the ￿nancial
system. Therefore, it o⁄ers rates of return such that the expected utility from
depositing funds is equal to the autarky level. As a result, the participation
constraint in equation (9) is binding.14
Because money is dominated in rate of return, the monopolist will only
devote funds to money balances in order to make payments to depositors who
experience relocation shocks. Consequently, monopoly pro￿ts come from excess
credit market revenues after payments to nonrelocated depositors. Furthermore,
substituting from the binding participation constraint (9), the bank￿ s problem




t(Rt) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)rn
t (Rt)x
In order to determine the impact of monetary policy under a fully concen-
trated banking sector, we proceed to study the economy￿ s steady-state:
De￿nition 2. A steady-state equilibrium in a fully concentrated banking
sector is an economy such that:
1. depositors put all of their funds in an account at the bank, (1) and (9);
2. the bank chooses a schedule (rm; rn; m; R) to maximize pro￿ts, (11);
14Since the expected utility in autarky only depends on exogenous parameter values, it is
possible to obtain a closed form solution for either the return to movers or non-movers. In
this manner, limited participation provides additional analytical tractability.
103. the self-selection condition for depositors holds, (8), and
4. the bank earns positive pro￿ts.






1￿￿ . Also, let
y >
￿












Under these conditions, a steady-state in the monopoly banking economy ex-
ists and is unique. In particular, the monopolist provides depositors with full
insurance against liquidity risk.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 3, the monopolist￿ s pro￿t maximizing
choice for the interest rate in the credit market is constrained by the requirement
that payments to non-movers must be at least as large as payments to movers.
That is, (unconstrained) pro￿ts are high when the monopolist charges a high
interest rate in the credit market. At high interest rates, the bank supplies a
relatively low amount of funds to borrowers. Since banks only value second
period pro￿ts, its cash holdings (m = x ￿ ld) will be high when it distorts the
credit market.
Therefore, at high interest rates in the credit market, the monopoly bank
provides depositors with a high degree of insurance against liquidity risk. Prior
to their realization of the need for liquidity, depositors would choose to put
their funds in the bank. In fact, ex-ante, individuals would be willing to accept
a higher rate of return in the event that relocation occurs. However, payments
to non-movers would not be su¢ cient to induce them to leave their funds at
the bank. That is, the self-selection constraint, (8), would not hold and all
depositors would seek to liquidate their funds early.
Consequently, the (constrained) pro￿t-maximizing interest rate occurs where
non-movers and movers earn the same rate of return. As a result, the self-
selection constraint binds:
rm = rn = r
Because depositors receive the same rate of return regardless of the realization of
their location status, the monopoly bank provides depositors with full insurance
against liquidity risk. Nevertheless, while they receive a deterministic amount
of income, they obtain a low rate of return.
In particular, as there is only one ￿nancial institution that provides risk
pooling services, the monopolist will only o⁄er enough income to induce lenders
to deposit their funds. That is, it will only o⁄er a su¢ cient return so that
the expected utility from participating in the ￿nancial system is equal to the
autarky level, u :






11In order to provide depositors with full insurance against relocation shocks,
the bank sets currency reserves equal to:
m = [(1 ￿ ￿)u]
1
1￿￿ (￿￿) (12)
In turn, the volume of loans and interest rate in the credit market are given by:







= x ￿ ￿￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)u]
1
1￿￿ (14)
With this background, it is possible to provide interpretation behind the






1￿￿ , is a su¢ cient condition for positive pro￿ts. Consequently, the bank
can pro￿tably operate as long as interest rates are positive in the credit market.
Moreover, as in the case of the perfectly competitive economy, the interest rate
on loans is higher when borrowers receive a large amount of income in old-
age. Thus, the second condition guarantees that money is dominated in rate of
return.
At this juncture, we o⁄er the following Proposition that describes the e⁄ects
of monetary policy in a monopolistic banking sector:
Proposition 4. In a fully concentrated banking economy, monetary policy
generates a reverse-Tobin e⁄ect. That is, an increase in the rate of money
growth is associated with a lower amount of loans and higher interest rates in
the credit market.
In contrast to perfectly competitive banks, a monopolist seeks to acquire
additional cash reserves under higher in￿ ation rates. For a given level of money
holdings, an increase in the in￿ ation rate reduces the return to movers. Since
non-movers would earn a higher rate of return than depositors who experience
liquidity shocks, higher rates of money growth provide the bank with an oppor-
tunity to further distort the credit market. That is, at higher rates of money
growth, the bank can issue even less loans. Because the bank acquires more
cash, movers will not experience a consumption loss from in￿ ation.
Interestingly, our results demonstrate that the competitive structure of the
￿nancial system should be an important factor in the determination of monetary
policy. If the ￿nancial sector is perfectly competitive, higher rates of money
growth raise the cost of holding money and increase the supply of funds to the
credit market. In contrast, in a monopoly system, money growth reduces the
availability of credit.15
15In order to promote the tractability of our framework, we have assumed that individuals
may only obtain access to money balances through ￿nancial institutions. Therefore, the
125 An Economy with Government Debt
The preceding sections examine how the impact of monetary policy depends
upon the industrial organization of the ￿nancial system. In economies where
￿nancial institutions have market power, pricing distortions can occur. As a
result, the e⁄ects of monetary policy can be substantially di⁄erent in economies
where banks engage in non-competitive behavior.
In this section, we extend our analysis to consider the possibility of gov-
ernment debt. Following Schreft and Smith (1997), the government ￿nances
interest payments on previously issued debt through seigniorage revenues and
new bonds. Accordingly, banks can acquire three di⁄erent types of ￿nancial
assets: money, loans to the private sector, and government bonds. In this man-
ner, seigniorage revenues transfer income between depositors who experience
di⁄erent realizations of the relocation (i.e., liquidity) shock.16
The primary purpose of this section is to illustrate that our previous insights
are robust to the possibility of in￿ ation-￿nanced government debt. As a starting
point, we focus on the case of a perfectly competitive ￿nancial system. The
section concludes with some remarks about the e⁄ects of money growth in the
presence of a monopoly bank.
Government bonds mature after one period and are default-free. In particu-
lar, one unit of goods held in bonds at t constitutes a sure claim to Rb
t units of






Since banks can allocate funds to an additional ￿nancial asset, a perfectly com-
petitive bank￿ s balance sheet constraint is given by:
mt + lt + bt ￿ x (16)
Furthermore, banks issue loans and acquire government bonds until both types














u is decreasing in the rate of money growth. Keeping the
expected utility from autarky constant, the monopolist can acquire more money if in￿ation is
higher. By comparison, in￿ation would also lower the value of autarky and reduce the need
for the monopolist to provide insurance against liquidity risk. However, as long as expected
utility is not too sensitive to in￿ation, our results continue to hold.
16As previously mentioned, the Appendix demonstrates that the impact of monetary policy
on credit market activity also applies to economies in which seigniorage revenues are redis-
tributed from old movers to old borrowers.
17Alternatively, one unit of bonds held in period t yields It units of currency in period t+1.




13Finally, the demand for cash reserves is the same as Section 3.
The following Lemma considers the impact of monetary policy in the econ-
omy with government debt:
Lemma 1. Suppose ￿ = 1




1￿￿. Under these conditions, a
steady-state in a perfectly competitive banking economy exists in the presence of
government debt. Furthermore, lending activity increases and interest rates in
the credit market decrease at higher rates of money growth.
Notably, Lemma 1 provides su¢ cient conditions in which the e⁄ects of
money growth from Section 3 extend to the possibility of government debt.
In Section 3, in￿ ation raises the cost of holding money and leads banks to issue
more loans to borrowers. If the government issues bonds, seigniorage revenues
provide the government with the ability to borrow funds and crowd out loans
to the private sector. However, if the government imposes a higher in￿ ation
tax, the seigniorage tax base falls because banks reduce their money holdings.
Consequently, this restricts the ability to issue more bonds at higher in￿ation
rates. As a result, the impact of monetary policy is qualitatively the same as
Section 3.
Using analogous reasoning, introducing government debt reinforces the ef-
fects of monetary policy on credit market activity in a concentrated ￿nancial
system. Due to the pricing distortions in the deposit market, a monopoly bank
acquires more money balances and issues less loans if money growth is higher.
Since money holdings increase, the seigniorage tax base is also higher, allowing
the government to supply more bonds. Therefore, at higher rates of money
growth, the crowding out e⁄ect becomes more signi￿cant. In this manner, our
results are robust to the possibility of in￿ ation-￿nanced government debt.
6 Conclusions
Recent evidence indicates that the competitive structure of the ￿nancial system
varies both within and across countries. In order to explore the impact of com-
petition in the ￿nancial sector, we develop a model of Bertrand competition. In
our framework, banks provide two di⁄erent types of ￿nancial services. In the
deposit market, banks insure individuals against liquidity risk. Alternatively, in
the credit market, ￿nancial institutions o⁄er loans so that agents can smooth
consumption over time. Notably, pricing decisions across markets a⁄ect over-
all ￿nancial market outcomes. For example, under perfect competition, higher
rates of money growth generate an increase in lending along with lower costs
of borrowing. However, in a monopoly banking sector, money growth reduces
the amount of loans and raises interest rates. Interestingly, the latter prediction
echoes recent empirical studies which emphasize that in￿ ation adversely a⁄ects
￿nancial sector performance. In this manner, our results suggest that noncom-
petitive behavior is a signi￿cant aspect of activity in the ￿nancial system.
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167 Technical Appendix
1. Proof of Proposition 1. Using a typical bank￿ s balance sheet, (5) and
the demand for cash reserves, (10), the supply of loans in the steady-state is
expressed by:
ls = (1 ￿ ￿ (R;￿))x (17)
where ￿ is the fraction of deposits allocated to real money balances, with
￿ (R;￿) = m
x . The steady-state behavior of the economy is characterized by
the equilibrium in the loan market. That is, the intersection of the demand and
supply of loans, (3) and (17); respectively.
First, it is clear that @l
s
@R > 0 while @l
d
@R < 0. Furthermore, lim
R!1
ls ! x and
lim
R!1
ld ! 0. Consequently, a steady-state where money is dominated in rate
of return exists and is unique if at R = 1
￿, the loan market is in excess demand.
Evaluating the credit market at R = 1
￿, an excess demand occurs when the
condition in Proposition 1 is satis￿ed. This completes the proof of Proposition
1.






= (1 ￿ ￿ (R;￿))x
























Furthermore, it is easy to verify that banks supply more loans under higher
rates of money growth, for a given R. Consequently, lending activity rises and
real interest rates fall under higher ￿. This completes the proof of Proposition
2.
3. Proof of Proposition 3. Imposing steady-state on the bank￿ s objective

























































The bank￿ s total revenue comes from income in the credit market and the
total costs come from payments to nonrelocated depositors. It is easy to ver-
ify that the total revenue curve and the total cost curve are decreasing in
R. In addition, lim
R!0
TR(R) = y, lim
R!0
TC(R;￿) ! 1, lim
R!1
TR(R) = 0, and
lim
R!1
TC(R;￿) ! ￿(￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)
"














Moreover, note that the monopolist￿ s pro￿t function is continuous and twice
di⁄erentiable in R. From the above, lim
R!1
￿ ! ￿￿ and lim
R!0
￿ ! ￿1. In this
manner, ￿(R) < 0 if ￿ > 0. Therefore, a solution to the monopolist problem
exists if ￿ < 0. That is, if ￿ < 0, it is clear that
@￿(R)
@R > 0. If the monopolist
is unconstrained, it would choose R ! 1 to minimize the cost of issuing loans
since @r
n
@R < 0. However, this is not feasible because (8) must hold in equilibrium.
Since the lower bound on rn is rm, the monopolist will choose R : rn = rm = r.
Using the fact that the self-selection constraint binds in equilibrium along
with (9), (6), and (7), we obtain the supply of loans, ls = x￿￿￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)u]
1
1￿￿.
Furthermore, money is dominated in rate of return if at R = 1
￿, there is an
excess demand for loans. Upon imposing R = 1
￿ on the loan market, an excess
demand for loans occurs when the condition in Proposition 3 is satis￿ed. This
completes the proof of Proposition 3.
4. Proof of Proposition 4. The equilibrium interest rate in the credit





= x ￿ ￿￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)u]
1
1￿￿
It is clear from the above polynomial that the equilibrium interest rate increases
under higher rates of money growth. Moreover, from the expression for loan
supply above, in￿ ation adversely a⁄ects lending activity. This completes the
proof of Proposition 4.
5. Proof of Lemma 1. Using the government budget constraint, (15),


































In this manner, the supply of loans is strictly increasing in R for ￿ > 1.












The sign of @l
s
@￿ depends on the sign of the term on the right hand side of the
equation. In particular, banks supply more loans under higher rates of money
growth if:
[R￿ ￿ 1](1 ￿ ￿) >
￿
1 ￿ ￿
Substituting the expression for ￿ and letting ￿ = 0:5, this condition can be
written as:




where I = R￿.




1￿￿, banks supply more loans under higher rates of
money growth. However, since we are interested in cases where I > ￿ > 1





1￿￿. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
6. Proofs for economies where seigniorage revenues are redistrib-
uted directly to old borrowers. First, we consider the existence and unique-
ness of a steady-state equilibrium under perfect competition. If old borrowers
receive transfers from the government, the demand for loans will be higher rel-
ative to the economy without transfers. Consequently, at R = 1
￿, if an excess
demand for loans occurs in the economy without seigniorage transfers, this nec-
essarily implies there is excess demand in the economy with seigniorage transfers.
We proceed by considering the e⁄ects of monetary policy on the credit mar-
ket. In the steady-state, the amount of transfers (￿) is such that ￿ = ￿￿1
￿ m.
Substituting this expression into the demand for loans and imposing equilibrium







= (1 ￿ ￿)x (18)



















￿ + R ￿
y
x







￿ + R >
y
x. Note that this condition always holds as total deposits
must exceed the amount of loans issued and R > 1.










































Since the denominator is positive, the sign of @R
@￿ depends on the sign of the
numerator. Using (19), it can be veri￿ed that @R









Subsequently, we study the e⁄ects of money growth on the amount of loans.
From the expression for money demand, (10), and some algebra, we can





























































































Clearly, the sign of the denominator determines the sign of @l
@￿. In particular,














which holds since (￿R)
1
￿ + R >
y
x and ￿ < 1:
We proceed to determine the impact of redistribution to old borrowers in a
monopolistic banking sector. Since the bank takes the amount of transfers by
the government as given, the bank￿ s problem is identical to the case without
transfers. Therefore, the bank￿ s problem pins down the amount of loans in the





= x ￿ ￿￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)u]
1
1￿￿
20For money to be dominated in rate of return, the demand for loans must be
signi￿cant at R = 1









￿ > x ￿ ￿￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)u]
1
1￿￿
This condition can be written as:
y >
￿






































Therefore, since x > 0 and ￿ > 1, a steady-state under ￿ > 0 exists if the
condition for existence under ￿ = 0 is satis￿ed. That is, if a steady-state exists
without transfers, it is also exists in the presence of transfers.
From previous work, the supply of loans is:
x ￿ ￿￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)u]
1
1￿￿
which implies there is a reverse-Tobin e⁄ect in a monolistic banking sector. The







￿ + R + ￿￿1
￿
￿ = x ￿ ￿￿ [(1 ￿ ￿)u]
1
1￿￿
















￿ + R + ￿￿1
￿
￿2
The sign of @l
d
@￿ depends on the term in the numerator. With some algebra,








Since the bank holds a positive amount of money balances in equlibrium, we





￿. Therfore, the numerator above is strictly positive
21in cases where ￿ > 0. This indicates that the demand for loans is higher.
Unambiguously, the interest on loans is higher as well.
These arguments demonstrate that our results in the main text are robust
to economies in which the government￿ s seigniorage revenues are redistributed
from depositors (movers) to old borrowers.
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